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This dissertation investigates how social structure shapes economic behavior and development outcomes in rural India. Across its chapters, it examines how socially embedded features of economic life - such as hierarchy, norms, and informal relations - condition cooperation and productive performance in contexts where formal institutions may not fully govern everyday interactions. Building on identity economics and social network theory, the thesis asks (i) how caste-based status differences influence cooperation and the distribution of returns from collective action, (ii) whether the connotations attached to group identity (positive vs. stigmatized) affect within-group cooperation, and (iii) how overlapping (multiplex) networks of information, credit, and friendship influence agricultural productivity. To answer the first two questions, the dissertation draws on lab-in-the-field experiments conducted with participants from high- and low-status caste groups. These experiments vary the social composition of interacting groups and the incentive structure of collective action in order to identify how status and identity shape cooperative behavior and the norms that underpin it. The third question is addressed using survey-based household and network data collected among rice farmers, which enable an analysis of how different types of social ties - considered both separately and in combination - relate to productivity outcomes. The experimental chapters show that cooperation in caste-stratified settings is shaped not only by incentives, but also by shared expectations about what constitutes an appropriate contribution rule when groups differ in status and in the benefits they receive. In mixed-caste public good settings, contribution norms shift with the benefit structure in ways that tend to prevent high-caste participants from ending up worse off: when returns favor them, equal contributions are seen as appropriate and provision is highest; when returns favor low-caste participants, the appropriate rule shifts toward equity-based contributions and overall provision falls. Chapter 3 adds that caste shapes cooperation also within same-caste groups: low-caste participants cooperate less than high-caste participants when identity is salient, consistent with the constraining effect of negative stereotypes, while role-model priming raises contributions - especially among low-caste participants - and narrows the caste-gap. Chapter 4 then turns to productive performance and shows that informal relations also matter for farming outcomes: Using a multiplex network framework, it finds that information-sharing ties are positively associated with agricultural productivity, and these gains are stronger when information ties overlap with friendship ties, suggesting that trust and relational closeness make knowledge transmission more effective. More broadly, the results suggest that farmers benefit most when information, credit, and friendship ties reinforce one another rather than operating in isolation. Taken together, the dissertation shows that both collective action and productivity are shaped by the social environments in which decisions are made. It highlights how caste-based hierarchy can structure cooperation through norms and identity-related constraints, and how network structure conditions the effectiveness of productivity-enhancing information. These findings imply that policies aimed at improving welfare and inclusion are likely to be more effective when they account for local social structure rather than relying on incentives or information alone.